To test young children's false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an ''accidental transgressor'' task, which measured a morallyrelevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.
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Introduction
Understanding the intentions of another person reflects a core aspect of moral judgment (Killen & Smetana, 2008; Turiel, 2006; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) and theory of mind (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Liu, 2004; Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001 ). For several decades, researchers in the field of moral development have demonstrated how young children, as early as 3 and 4 years of age, evaluate moral transgressions on the basis of the negative intrinsic consequences to others rather than on external consequences such as teacher mandates or punishment (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006) . In addition, several decades of research on children's theory of mind has documented the emergence of increasingly robust reasoning about others' mental states during the same time period (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; Perner et al., 1989; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 ).
Moral judgment and theory of mind
Recently, there has been interest in whether theory of mind competence is related to understanding another's intentions regarding morally relevant actions (Astington, 2004; Chandler, Sokol, & Wainryb, 2000; Knobe, 2005; Lagattuta, 2005; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006; Wellman & Miller, 2008; Zelazo et al., 1996) . The foci of the studies differ but converge on the overall expectation that theory of mind and moral judgment are interrelated. What is apparent is that the way that theory of mind is assessed is fairly consistent across studies, with measures including false belief competence in childhood (most often) and measures assessing reasoning about the desires of others. The moral judgment tasks, however, reflect a wide range of measures, from punishment acceptability for transgressions, to ratings of severity of a transgression as well as the 0010-0277/$ -see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.006
